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A CHILD LITIGANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Kevin Lapp*
As the Supreme Court put it a half century ago, the right to 
counsel for juveniles reflects “society’s special concern for children” 
and “is of the essence of justice.” In a variety of legal proceedings, 
from delinquency matters to child welfare proceedings to judicial 
bypass hearings, the law requires the appointment of counsel to child 
litigants. While coherent in the whole, the law regarding counsel for 
child litigants is a patchwork of state and federal constitutional 
rulings by courts and statutory grants. Legal scholarship about a child 
litigant’s right to counsel is similarly fragmented. Predominantly, 
legal scholars have examined arguments for a child litigant’s right to 
counsel at government expense by focusing on a particular kind of 
proceeding. 
This Article offers a unified theory for a child litigant’s right 
to counsel at government expense that spans judicial proceedings. In 
legal proceedings where significant legal rights or interests are at 
stake, fairness demands that child litigants have a right to counsel at 
government expense in those proceedings. In the main, the law 
coheres with the theory proposed here. However, one type of 
proceeding involving tens of thousands of juveniles annually with 
tremendous consequences stands as an unjustifiable outlier – 
immigration removal (deportation) proceedings. 
  
 
 * Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In immigration removal (deportation) proceedings, respondents 
do not have a right to counsel at government expense.1 Each year, as 
many as a hundred thousand or more people represent themselves in 
these proceedings.2 The number includes tens of thousands of 
respondents under the age of eighteen.3 Jack Weil, a federal 
immigration judge who was responsible for training other immigration 
judges, was recently asked during a deposition if there were some 
respondents in immigration court so young that they would not be able 
to understand the court proceedings.4 He insisted it was a case-by-case 
determination.5 In explaining why a judge could allow a removal 
hearing against an unrepresented child to go forward, he averred that 
“I’ve taught immigration law literally to three year olds and four year 
olds. It takes a lot of time. It takes a lot of patience. They get it. It’s 
not the most efficient, but it can be done.”6 Judge Weil doubled down 
later in the deposition. When asked if there were any cases involving 
children where the only way to ensure that the child received a fair 
hearing was either to stop the proceeding or provide counsel, he 
reiterated, “I have trained three year olds and four year olds in 
immigration law. You can do a fair hearing [without providing the 
child with a lawyer].”7 
The judge’s claim is hard to take seriously. As legal and child 
psychology experts remarked after learning of Judge Weil’s 
testimony, key developmental milestones for three- and four-year-olds 
include saying simple sentences and building towers of blocks.8 At the 
same time, immigration law is notoriously inscrutable.9 According to 
 
 1. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012). 
 2. Details on Deportation Proceedings in Immigration Court, TRAC IMMIGRATION 
(Nov. 2018), https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/nta/. 
 3. Juveniles — Immigration Court Deportation Proceedings, TRAC IMMIGRATION 
(June 8, 2014), https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/juvenile/. 
 4. Transcript of Deposition of Honorable Jack H. Weil, J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026 
(9th Cir. 2016) (No. 2:14-cv-01026-TSZ), at 69:18–22. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 69:24–70:3. 
 7. Id. at 160:13–161:12. 
 8. Jerry Markon, Can a 3-Year Old Represent Herself in Immigration Court? This Judge 
Thinks So, WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/can-a-3-year-old-represent-herself-in-immigration-court-this-judge-thinks-
so/2016/03/03/5be59a32-db25-11e5-925f-1d10062cc82d_story.html?utm_term=.b69ad5822554. 
 9. Baltazar-Alcazar v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 386 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(stating that courts have repeatedly recognized that the immigration laws are “second only to the 
Internal Revenue Code in complexity”). 
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the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, “[a] lawyer is often the only person 
who [can] thread the [immigration-law] labyrinth.”10 Yet, Judge 
Weil’s insistence on the fairness of adversarial removal proceedings 
against unrepresented children reflects prevailing due process law.11 
This conflicts with a broad national consensus that child litigants 
should be appointed counsel in legal proceedings. As the Supreme 
Court put it a half century ago, the right to counsel for juveniles 
reflects “society’s special concern for children” and “is of the essence 
of justice.”12 In a variety of civil proceedings, from delinquency 
matters to child welfare proceedings to judicial bypass hearings, the 
law requires the appointment of counsel to child litigants.13 
While coherent in the whole, the law regarding counsel for child 
litigants is a patchwork of state and federal constitutional rulings by 
courts and statutory grants. This mishmash is partly the result of the 
right developing haphazardly. Sometimes, legislation created the 
right. Other times, litigation resulted in court rulings that child litigants 
are entitled to counsel at government expense. Always, the right has 
expanded one kind of legal proceeding at a time. And though there 
have been occasional delays and a rare dead end here and there, the 
right has steadily expanded since a juvenile litigant’s due process right 
to appointed counsel was first recognized over half a century ago.14 
Legal scholarship about a child litigant’s right to counsel is 
similarly fragmented. Predominantly, legal scholars have examined 
arguments for a child litigant’s right to counsel at government expense 
by focusing on a particular kind of proceeding.15 This scholarship 
invariably makes its case for appointed counsel within the prevailing 
framework of the Mathews v. Eldridge (1976)16 due process balancing 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. See, e.g., Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding 
that non-citizens have a due process right to secure counsel of their choice, but at their own 
expense). 
 12. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554, 561 (1966). 
 13. See infra, Part II. 
 14. Kent, 383 U.S. at 554 (holding that juveniles have a due process right to counsel at transfer 
hearings to determine whether a juvenile’s case would go forward in criminal rather than juvenile 
court); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1967) (holding that juveniles have a due process right to 
counsel at the adjudication stage of juvenile delinquency proceedings). 
 15. See, e.g., Benjamin Good, A Child’s Right to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 10 STAN. 
J. C.R. & C.L. 109 (2014); Erik Pitchal, Children’s Constitutional Right to Counsel in Dependency 
Cases, 15 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 663 (2006); Julie K. Waterstone, Counsel in School Exclusion 
Cases: Leveling the Playing Field, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 471 (2016). 
 16. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
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test, which narrows the focus to the stakes, interests, and procedures 
of a particular type of proceeding.17 What is lacking in the literature is 
a unified theory for a child litigant’s right to counsel at government 
expense that spans judicial proceedings. 
This Article attempts to offer such a theory. Because the theory 
addresses the fairness of proceedings involving juvenile litigants writ 
large, it eschews a three-part Mathews inquiry. Nor is the theory 
tethered to particular empirical findings from neuroscience, adolescent 
brain development, or developmental psychology.18 That research 
undoubtedly supports the theory of appointed counsel for child 
litigants advanced here.19 But as the Supreme Court recently observed, 
the differences between children and adults are generally known 
“commonsense propositions,” which “the literature confirms” but for 
which “citation to social science and cognitive science authorities is 
unnecessary.”20 Moreover, differences beyond cognitive capacities—
such as a child’s presumptive lack of financial resources to hire 
counsel, and the government’s parens patriae obligation toward 
children—inform the theory as well. 
The theory is quite simple. In legal proceedings where significant 
legal rights or interests are at stake, fairness demands that a child 
litigant have a right to counsel at government expense in those 
proceedings.21 The theory is grounded in the core value of fairness and 
the longstanding accommodation in the law of stable and enduring 
truths about the differences between children and adults.22 
 
 17. See, e.g., Pitchal, supra note 15, at 695 (2006) (“Though criticized, Mathews has been 
widely accepted by courts and repeatedly applied by the Supreme Court, so advocates have no 
choice but to filter arguments through its rubric.”). Mathews v. Eldridge identified a three-part 
balancing test for determining whether a proceeding comported with due process, including (1) the 
private interest at stake in the proceedings; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest 
under current procedures and the likelihood that additional or substitute procedural safeguards 
would reduce that risk; and (3) the government’s interest, including the fiscal and administrative 
burdens that a proposed procedural safeguard would impose. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 321. 
 18. See Tamar R. Birckhead, Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice for Juveniles, 57 BUFF. 
L. REV. 1447 (2009) (examining empirical studies in the area of procedural justice theory and 
urging courts to allow social science research related to adolescents and conceptions of procedural 
justice to inform the decision of whether juveniles should get certain procedural rights). 
 19. See infra, Part I. 
 20. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 273 n.5 (2011); see also Martin Guggenheim & 
Randy Hertz, J.D.B. and the Maturing of Juvenile Confession Suppression Law, 38 WASH. U. J.L. 
& POL’Y 109, 154 (2012) (noting that “Justice Sotomayor shifted the focus from the realm of 
social science to what she termed “commonsense propositions” about the nature of adolescence”). 
 21. The theory does not encompass civil matters between private parties. 
 22. Terry A. Maroney, The Once and Future Juvenile Brain, in CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR 
AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 189, 201 (Franklin E. Zimring & David S. Tanenhaus eds., 2014). 
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The theory is outlined in Part I. Answering whether child litigants 
should be entitled to counsel at government expense involves two 
simple questions: (1) are significant interests at stake in the 
proceedings?; and (2) is the litigant before the court a minor? If the 
answer to both is yes, then fairness demands that the government 
provide the child litigant with counsel. 
Part II lays out the current legal landscape of a child litigant’s 
right to appointed counsel. In the main, the law coheres with the 
theory.23 Part III identifies one type of proceeding involving tens of 
thousands of juveniles annually with tremendous consequences that 
stands as an outlier—immigration removal (deportation) proceedings. 
This Part explains why child respondents in removal proceedings 
should be provided with counsel as a matter of due process. 
PART I:  A COMMON SENSE THEORY OF A RIGHT TO APPOINTED 
COUNSEL FOR CHILD LITIGANTS 
Few would assert with a straight face that a legal proceeding that 
could result in the detention of a juvenile, the separation of the juvenile 
from her family, or the denial of a juvenile’s right to make 
reproductive choices—whatever the young person’s age—could be 
fair if the juvenile did not have the benefit of legal counsel. That 
commonsense proposition undergirds the theory of a right to 
appointed counsel for child litigants asserted here. Children are 
different from adults in well-known ways relevant to their need for 
counsel in judicial proceedings, and those differences are shared by 
juveniles generally. As a result, proceedings impacting a child’s 
significant interest are fair only when the child is provided with 
counsel. This holds whatever the administrative or financial burdens 
the requirement of appointed counsel for child litigants might impose. 
This Part first explains why a rule demanding appointed counsel 
for child litigants is a matter of common sense, buttressed by 
developmental research about the cognitive capacities of children and 
adolescents. It then explains why the theory calls for a categorical right 
 
 23. That does not mean that all jurisdictions fully ensure that child litigants do not proceed 
unrepresented. As the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention recently observed, 
provisions for waiver of counsel, “paired with limited internal oversight of juvenile indigent 
defense practices, can leave youth legally unrepresented.” OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & 
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, LITERATURE 
REVIEW: INDIGENT DEFENSE FOR JUVENILES 3 (2018), https://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/litreviews/In
digent-Defense-for-Juveniles.pdf. 
(9) 52.4_LAPP (DO NOT DELETE) 1/6/2020  4:41 PM 
2019] A CHILD LITIGANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL 469 
to counsel, and not a case-by-case inquiry into individual 
circumstances. Finally, it defines “significant interests” to include 
long- and oft-recognized liberty and property interests, as well as a 
child’s right to family integrity. 
A.  Common Sense 
The idea that juveniles are different from adults and demand 
different legal standards is neither new nor controversial. The law has 
long accounted for the reality that juveniles “characteristically lack the 
capacity to exercise mature judgment and possess only an incomplete 
ability to understand the world around them.”24 From age-related 
driving and alcohol rules to restrictions on the enforceability of 
contracts entered into with minors25 and innumerable other provisions, 
laws safeguard juveniles from their own vulnerabilities.26 Indeed, “it 
is the odd legal rule that does not have some form of exception for 
children.”27 
Due process jurisprudence is no different. A quartet of cases 
decided by the Supreme Court between the 1930s and the 1960s 
recognized that fairness demanded special rules for children. The first 
two cases involved interrogation by police. In Haley v. Ohio (1948),28 
a plurality concluded that a statement obtained from a fifteen-year-old 
interrogated by relays of police from midnight until he confessed 
around 5:00 a.m. without a lawyer or an adult with him was 
involuntary and coerced in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.29 According to the Court, “a mere child—an 
easy victim of the law— . . . cannot be judged by the more exacting 
 
 24. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 273. 
 25. Children at common law, and in many cases still to this day, could void a legal contract at 
their option. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 230 (2d ed. 1990) (“Common law courts early 
announced the prevailing view that a minor’s contract is ‘voidable’ at the instance of the minor.”); 
Cheryl B. Preston & Brandon T. Crowther, Infancy Doctrine Inquiries, 52 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 47, 50–51 (2012). 
 26. See Kevin Lapp, Databasing Delinquency, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 195, 202 (2015) (“Two 
particular vulnerabilities of youth—their susceptibility to poor decisionmaking and their physical 
and emotional immaturity—shape the legal regulation of juveniles.”). 
 27. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 481 (2012). 
 28. 332 U.S. 596 (1948). 
 29. Id. at 601. Until the mid-twentieth century, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause regulated police interrogation. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (declaring that 
no person may be deprived of “life, liberty, or property without due process of law”). It required 
that confessions be voluntary, prohibiting law enforcement from overbearing the will of a suspect 
to get her to confess. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320–24 (1959). 
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standards of maturity.”30 That law enforcement advised the youth of 
his rights was not sufficient for him to go it alone against government 
agents.31 In Gallegos v. Colorado (1962),32 the Supreme Court 
reiterated that a juvenile subject of police interrogation “cannot be 
compared with an adult in full possession of his senses and 
knowledgeable of the consequences of his admissions.”33 Juvenile 
interrogation, the court explained, involves “a person who is not equal 
to the police in knowledge and understanding of the consequences of 
the questions and answers being recorded and who is unable to know 
how to protect his own interests or how to get the benefits of his 
constitutional rights.”34 In the Court’s view, a juvenile suspect could 
not, by himself, “know, let alone assert, such constitutional rights as 
he had.”35 
A pair of cases from the 1960s brought due process protections 
from the station house to the courthouse. In Kent v. United States 
(1966),36 the Supreme Court recognized a due process right to 
appointed counsel for juveniles at transfer hearings, where juvenile 
court judges determine whether to transfer a delinquency case to adult 
criminal court.37 The Court held that only the appointment of counsel 
for the juvenile would ensure that the transfer hearing would be 
fundamentally fair.38 In In re Gault (1967),39 the Supreme Court 
expanded the due process right to appointed counsel to juvenile 
respondents at the adjudication stage of civil delinquency proceedings 
because “[t]he juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with 
problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon 
 
 30. Haley, 332 U.S. at 599. 
 31. Id. at 601 (The Court could not “indulge [the] assumptions” that a fifteen-year-old, without 
the aid of counsel, “would have a full appreciation of that advice and that . . . he had a freedom of 
choice.”). 
 32. 370 U.S. 49 (1962). 
 33. Id. at 54 (Gallegos was a fourteen-year-old held for five days without seeing a lawyer, 
parent, or other friendly adult who, after being advised of his right to silence by police, confessed 
to an assault.). 
 34. Id. (This conclusion applied “no matter how sophisticated” the juvenile.). 
 35. Id. 
 36. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
 37. Id at 564. 
 38. Id. at 561; see generally id. at 554 (The provision of counsel, the Court observed, was part 
of “society’s special concern for children.”). 
 39. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).  
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regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a 
defense and to prepare and submit it.”40 
Notably, none of these cases involved amicus briefs from 
psychologists, and none involved citations to scientific findings 
regarding the distinguishing cognitive or psychosocial characteristics 
of juveniles. Indeed, long before the brain development revolution of 
the last couple of decades, judges and policymakers plainly 
understood that the differences between children and adults demanded 
special accommodations to ensure fairness. As the President’s 
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice 
observed fifty years ago, “[t]he most informal and well-intentioned of 
judicial proceedings are technical; few adults without legal training 
can influence or even understand them; certainly children cannot.”41 
The last three decades have brought empirical backing to these 
common sense conclusions and spurred a renewed effort to ensure that 
the law provides children with special protections. The first major 
ruling, Roper v. Simmons (2005),42 outlawed the death penalty for 
juvenile offenders.43 The decision was grounded in “general 
differences between juveniles under 18 and adults” that are “too 
marked and well understood” to ignore.44 Yet, as Professor Terry 
Maroney has observed, despite the emphasis on brain science in 
argument and in filings, the Supreme Court dedicated “a grand total of 
one phrase” to that science.45 According to the Court, its conclusions 
about the distinguishing characteristics of juveniles reflect what “any 
parent knows.”46 In Graham v. Florida (2010),47 which outlawed life 
without parole sentences for non-homicide offenses committed by 
juveniles, the citation to science grew to two sentences.48 The 
 
 40. Id. at 36. 
 41. U.S. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF 
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 86 (1967). 
 42. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 43. Id. at 551. 
 44. Id. at 569, 572. 
 45. Maroney, supra note 22, at 197. 
 46. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. 
 47. 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
 48. Id. at 68 (noting that “developments in psychology and brain science continue to show 
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds”); see Maroney, supra note 22, at 201. 
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discussion expanded to a paragraph in Miller v. Alabama (2012),49 the 
Court’s third juvenile sentencing case.50 
That accommodations for youth within the law are grounded as 
much in common sense and long-known, stable truths as new 
scientific findings was brought home by the Supreme Court in its 
recent case crafting special considerations for youth interrogated by 
police. In J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011),51 the Court put it plainly: 
a person’s age “generates commonsense conclusions about behavior 
and perception” that “apply broadly to children as a class” and “are 
self-evident to anyone who was a child once himself.”52 Individuals 
“need no imaginative powers, knowledge of developmental 
psychology, training in cognitive science, or expertise in social and 
cultural anthropology to account for a child’s age.53 They simply need 
the common sense to know that a 7-year-old is not a 13-year-old and 
neither is an adult.”54 According to the Court, “to ignore the very real 
differences between children and adults . . . would be to deny children 
the full scope of the procedural safeguards” offered by the law.55 The 
Court, in short, could discern no reason to blind itself to the 
“commonsense reality” that juveniles are different from adults in ways 
that matter to the law.56 
The upshot of these cases is that developmental science is but 
“one source of data tending to confirm a general proposition about 
gross differences between adolescents and adults” relevant throughout 
the law.57 Rather than a brain science revolution in the twenty-first 
century regarding juveniles and the law, therefore, there is instead, 
after a wayward period,58 a revived commitment to providing children 
 
 49. 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
 50. Id. at 471, 472 n.5 (observing that Roper and Graham “rested not only on common sense—
on what ‘any parent knows’—but on science and social science as well” and acknowledging that 
“[t]he evidence presented to us in these cases indicates that the science and social science 
supporting Roper’s and Graham’s conclusions have become even stronger”). 
 51. 564 U.S. 261 (2011). 
 52. Id. at 272. 
 53. Id. at 279–80. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 281 (referring to, in this context, the Miranda procedural safeguards of individuals 
interrogated by police while in custody). 
 56. Id. at 265. 
 57. Id. at 273 (given a history “replete with laws and judicial recognition’ that children cannot 
be viewed simply as miniature adults”); Maroney, supra note 22, at 201. 
 58. See Perry L. Moriearty, Framing Justice: Media, Bias, and Legal Decisionmaking, 69 MD. 
L. REV. 849, 851–82 (2010); Franklin E. Zimring, The 1990s Assault on Juvenile Justice: Notes 
from an Ideological Battleground, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 260, 260 (1999). 
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with enhanced protections on account of “commonsense conclusions” 
that “anyone who was a child” knows.59 
Perhaps no such protection is more important than the right to 
appointed legal counsel for juveniles involved in judicial proceedings. 
Litigants in general (be they juveniles or adults) need the assistance of 
counsel for many reasons. At the adjudication stage, counsel ensures 
the procedural fairness of legal proceedings, helps litigants negotiate 
pre-trial matters, safeguards litigants’ substantive rights, asserts 
claims and defenses, presents and tests evidence, holds opposing 
counsel to its burden of proof, advocates for fair resolutions and 
discretionary relief, and preserves issues for appeal. The assistance of 
a lawyer is especially important in complex legal proceedings that 
involve intricate statutory schemes that demand familiarity and 
understanding of state and federal case law to interpret and apply. 
When those complex legal proceedings can result in detention, and 
separation from family and community, appointing counsel becomes 
imperative. 
The characteristics of youth greatly heighten the need for 
counsel.60 A substantial body of research has consistently 
demonstrated that adolescents lack a basic understanding of court 
proceedings and the cognitive capacities to represent themselves.61 In 
brief, the research supports the following findings about adolescents: 
• adolescents’ brain structures for planning and similar 
tasks are still developing; 
• adolescents’ undeveloped capability of regulating 
impulses or emotions frustrates their ability to think 
strategically about important decisions; 
 
 59. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 272. 
 60. Larry Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards a Comprehensive and Consistent 
Vision of Children and Their Status Under Law, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 275, 323 (2006) 
(recognizing that while there are exceptions, the general rule is that people under the majority age 
are legally incompetent). 
 61. See Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, Researching Adolescents’ Judgment and 
Culpability, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 325, 
341–42 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000); Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence 
Steinberg, The Cognitive and Affective Influences on Adolescent Decision-Making, 68 TEMP. L. 
REV. 1763, 1774–80 (1995); Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in 
Legal Contexts, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 221, 222–23 (1995); Jay N. Giedd, The Amazing Teen Brain, 
SCI. AM., June 2015, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/risky-teen-behavior-is-driven-
by-an-imbalance-in-brain-development/ (“MRI studies show that the teenage brain is not an old 
child brain or a half-baked adult brain; it is a unique entity characterized by changeability . . . . 
[T]he prefrontal cortex, which controls impulses, does not mature until the 20s.”). 
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• adolescents’ undeveloped planning ability makes them 
less future-oriented, and less capable of properly 
understanding the consequences of their decisions; 
• adolescents are more likely than adults to yield to 
authority figures rather than make their own decisions; 
• adolescents’ decision-making deficiencies are magnified 
in stressful situations; and 
• parents do not make up for adolescents’ lack of cognitive 
capacity.62 
Some of these characteristics alone demonstrate that adolescents 
lack the capacity to represent themselves in judicial proceedings. 
Taken together, the list is irrefutable. 
The state’s parens patriae obligation further underscores the need 
to provide appointed counsel for child litigants. Originating in Anglo-
American common law centuries ago, the doctrine encompasses the 
government’s power and responsibility to protect and care for those 
who cannot take care of themselves, including children.63 Latin for 
“parent of the country,” the parens patraie doctrine obligates the state 
to serve as the ultimate protector of a child’s interests.64 This interest 
favors appointed counsel for child litigants.65 
Finally, the dependence that marks childhood makes appointed 
counsel necessary. Simply put, most youth lack the financial resources 
to secure counsel for themselves. This is especially true of youths who 
come into contact with criminal justice and family court systems.66 
 
 62. See RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE: A DEVELOPMENTAL 
APPROACH 89–116 (2013); ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING 
JUVENILE JUSTICE 46–60 (2008). 
 63. Natalie Loder Clark, Parens Patriae and a Modest Proposal for the Twenty-First Century: 
Legal Philosophy and a New Look at Children’s Welfare, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 381, 382 (2000); 
Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195 (1978). 
 64. See Clark, supra note 63, at 415 (“[T]he doctrine of parens patriae itself gives government 
the power to act parentally towards children, beyond its police power over adult citizens and beyond 
protecting them from its own or others’ coercion.”). 
 65. Good, supra note 15, at 141. 
 66. See Katherine Hunt Federle, Child Welfare and the Juvenile Court, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1225, 
1237 (1999) (“[T]he risks associated with poverty make it more likely for poor children and their 
families to end up in the juvenile court system.”); Jane M. Spinak, Adding Value to Families: The 
Potential of Model Family Courts, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 331, 346–47 (2002) (“[T]he overwhelming 
majority of child protective proceedings involve the poor . . . .”). 
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B.  Categorical 
In due process cases, the law typically takes a categorical 
approach. The governing test for determining whether a proceeding 
comported with due process is the Mathews v. Eldridge test, which 
balances (1) the private interest at stake in the proceedings; (2) the risk 
of erroneous deprivation of such interest under current procedures and 
the likelihood that additional or substitute procedural safeguards 
would reduce that risk; and (3) the government’s interest, including 
the fiscal and administrative burdens that a proposed procedural 
safeguard would impose.67 Predominantly, the Supreme Court has 
applied the Mathews balancing test categorically. As the Court has put 
it repeatedly, “a process must be judged by the generality of cases to 
which it applies, not the rare exceptions.”68 This means that courts do 
not focus on any particular litigant or case, but analyze the interests at 
stake for claimants like the plaintiff, and consider the costs and the 
benefits of the additional procedure across the general category of 
proceedings.69 
Due process claims by juveniles have been analyzed as 
categorical claims and resolved with categorical rules, even outside 
the Mathews framework. The foundational juvenile due process cases 
of Kent and Gault, for example, found that due process required 
counsel for juveniles, not because the individual characteristics of 
Morris Kent or Gerald Gault made counsel necessary in their 
particular cases, but because juveniles as a class need counsel for their 
proceedings to be fundamentally fair.70 Similarly, the Supreme 
Court’s recent sentencing cases have resulted in bright-line 
prohibitions on the death penalty and automatic life without parole 
 
 67. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 68. Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 321, 330 (1985); see 
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344 (“[Procedural] rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the 
truthfinding process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions.”); Santosky v. 
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 757 (1982) (same); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 612–13 (1979) (same); 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680 n.49 (1977) (same). 
 69. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 341–44, 348 (considering what is “typically” or “generally” true 
of claimants and whether additional procedures would “often” or “in most cases” reduce the risk 
of error); John Pollock, The Case Against Case-by-Case: Identifying Categorical Rights to Counsel 
in Basic Human Needs Cases, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 763, 813 (2013). But see Turner v. Rogers, 564 
U.S. 431 (2011) (rejecting a due process claim to appointed counsel in all civil contempt cases and 
holding that, on a case-by-case basis, individuals may require counsel to ensure that their 
proceeding was fundamentally fair). Notably, Turner did not address proceedings where the 
government “is likely to have counsel or some competent representative.” Id. at 449. 
 70. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561–62 (1966). 
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sentences for juvenile offenders.71 Likewise, when insisting on special 
protections for youth subject to police interrogation, the Court 
observed that legal protections for juveniles “as a class” reflect “the 
settled understanding that the differentiating characteristics of youth 
are universal.”72 
There is no reason to depart from this categorical approach with 
regard to a right to counsel for child litigants. While the categorical 
method comes with occasional under- or over-inclusiveness,73 the 
reason that fairness demands counsel for child litigants—the 
distinguishing characteristics of youth as a class—will always be 
present. Further, a categorical approach optimizes fairness, and it is 
much more efficient to treat members of a large similar group in a like 
manner. 
A categorical approach for due process claims to counsel by child 
litigants is also preferred because of the shortcomings of the Mathews 
balancing approach.74 Specifically with respect to child litigants, the 
Mathews balancing approach does not sufficiently allow for 
consideration of the distinguishing characteristics of child litigants and 
the long-held commitment within the law to special rules for youth. 
For example, Mathews factor one is the private interest at stake.75 
While children are autonomous individuals with liberty interests of 
their own, this factor is easily clouded by children’s status as 
dependents of adults who possess strong rights to control them.76 As 
 
 71. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 72. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 273 (2011). More often than not, this results in 
lines drawn at age 18, though that is not always the case. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551, 574 (2005) (“The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes 
between childhood and adulthood.”); Jonathan Todres, Maturity, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1107, 1116 
(2012) (“[B]enchmarks of maturity in the law frequently occur at different points in time.”). 
 73. Roper, 543 U.S. at 574 (“Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to the 
objections always raised against categorical rules.”). 
 74. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 103–05 
(1985) (arguing that Mathews transformed due process inquiries into utilitarian ones that 
subordinated the intrinsic value of the process as a fundamental, individual right); LAURENCE H. 
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 674 (2d ed. 1988) (“[The Mathews court’s] approach 
overlooks the unquantifiable human interest in receiving decent treatment . . . [and] provides the 
Court a facile means to justify the most cursory procedures by altering the relative weights to be 
accorded each of the three factors.”); Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. 
L. REV. 1059, 1105 (2012) (“One of the many shortcomings of the Mathews balancing test is that 
it privileges error costs over other costs as the relevant deprivation.”). 
 75. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 76. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the 
Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1036–50 (1992). 
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the Supreme Court put it in a case regarding pretrial detention, a 
juvenile’s liberty interest “must be qualified” because “juveniles, 
unlike adults, are always in some form of custody.”77 The status of 
children, therefore, and the frequent presence of adults alongside child 
litigants, makes it easy for courts to undervalue the private interests at 
stake. 
The state’s parens patriae obligation further muddies the 
Mathews analysis when due process claims are brought by children. 
Because the child’s interest in his own welfare and the state’s interest 
in the child’s welfare overlap, the parens patriae obligation might be 
thought to double the weight of the child’s best interest in the Mathews 
due process balancing.78 Often, courts consider the parens patriae 
interest as promoted by procedures that enhance the accuracy of 
proceedings.79 Sometimes, however, courts have considered the 
parens patriae interest as weighing against additional procedures 
because the government interest in protecting the welfare of the child 
was thought vindicated by a speedy resolution of the proceedings.80 In 
Gault, the Supreme Court held that the parens patriae nature of 
delinquency proceedings was not sufficient to protect an 
unrepresented child litigant’s interests.81 All of which is to say that 
courts struggled to consistently factor the parens patriae obligation 
into the Mathews balancing inquiry. 
 
 77. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (A juvenile’s “interest in freedom from 
institutional restraints . . . is undoubtedly substantial . . . But that interest must be qualified by the 
recognition that juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody.”). 
 78. See Davis v. Page, 714 F.2d 512, 529 (5th Cir. 1983) (Vance, J., dissenting) (“The interest 
of the state as parens patriae is identical to the interest of the child.”); In re Sanders, 852 N.W.2d 
524, 555 (Mich. 2014); Good, supra note 15, at 141 (noting that the parens patriae interest therefore 
weighs on the private-interest side of the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing scale, and favors counsel 
for child litigants). As Benjamin Good has observed, the parens patriae interest as part of a 
Mathews balancing “is something of a paradox—though it belongs to the government, it is 
vindicated by the procedural safeguards sought by [children]” in due process litigation. Good, supra 
note 15, at 141. 
 79. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982). 
 80. In re Alexander V., 613 A.2d 780, 785 (Conn. 1992) (“We must, therefore, consider the 
state’s interest, as parens patriae, in minimizing the delay that a competency hearing would 
occasion in promptly determining the child’s uncertain future.”); see also GPH v. Giles, 578 N.E.2d 
729, 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (“The state, in exercising its parens patriae role and for the finite 
period specified in the emergency detention statute, may limit an alleged mental patient’s 
constitutional right to counsel.”). 
 81. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 35–36 (1976) (finding that neither the probation officer nor the 
juvenile court judge could sufficiently protect the juvenile litigants’ interests and that due process 
demanded counsel for juveniles). 
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To be consistent with due process jurisprudence generally, to 
avoid the blind spots of a Mathews balancing, and because the 
characteristics of youth that make counsel necessary are always 
present for child litigants, the right to appointed counsel for child 
litigants should be a categorical one. 
C.  “Significant Interest” 
The due process clauses protect against deprivations of liberty 
and property.82 Physical liberty is a significant, but not the only, liberty 
interest protected by due process.83 Courts have also found that the 
right to family integrity is a significant interest held by children 
protected by due process.84 Because of the broad scope of the interests 
protected by due process, judicial proceedings involving a child 
litigant that do not deal with a significant liberty or property interest 
are rare. 
PART II:  THE RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL FOR CHILD LITIGANTS: 
CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE85 
This Part explores the current legal landscape of a child litigant’s 
right to appointed counsel. It shows a broad national consensus that 
fairness demands appointed counsel for juveniles in civil proceedings 
when significant rights or liberty are at stake.86 
 
 82. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. (“[N]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”); Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 
(1972) (“To have a property interest in a benefit [protected by the due process clause], a person 
clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral 
expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”). 
 83. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997) (noting that the “liberty” protected 
by the due process clause “includes more than the absence of physical restraint”); Foucha v. 
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (“[F]reedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of 
the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.”). 
 84. See Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Supreme Court cases) 
(“Parents and children have a well-elaborated constitutional right to live together without 
governmental interference.”); Wooley v. City of Baton Rouge, 211 F.3d 913, 923 (5th Cir. 
2000) (“[A] child’s right to family integrity is concomitant to that of a parent.”) 
 85. The bulk of the content of this Part was compiled by the author for an amicus curiae brief 
submitted to the Ninth Circuit in the case of C.J.L.G. Amicus Curiae Brief of Professor Kevin Lapp, 
et al. in Support of Reversal, C.J.L.G. v. Sessions, No. 16-73801 (9th Cir. Mar. 15, 2018). 
 86. Many jurisdictions have not yet fulfilled the mandates of appointed counsel for juveniles, 
and many juveniles proceed pro se because courts permit them to waive appointed counsel. See 
Marsha Levick & Neha Desai, Still Waiting: The Elusive Quest to Ensure Juveniles a 
Constitutional Right to Counsel at All Stages of the Juvenile Court Process, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 
175 (2007); Wallace J. Mlyniec, In re Gault at 40: The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court—A 
Promise Unfulfilled, 44 No. 3 CRIM. L. BULL. no. 3, 2008, Art. 5 (2008). 
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A.  Criminal and Delinquency Proceedings 
Since the United States Supreme Court held in Powell v. Alabama 
(1932)87 that “the failure of the trial court to make an effective 
appointment of counsel was . . . a denial of due process” in a capital 
case,88 the right to counsel at government expense in legal proceedings 
has spread widely. The right was expanded to all federal criminal 
defendants in Johnson v. Zerbst (1938).89 In Gideon v. Wainwright 
(1963),90 the Supreme Court held that due process demanded that all 
criminal defendants facing felony charges in federal or state court be 
provided with counsel.91 
Shortly after Gideon, the Court held that due process demands 
appointed counsel for juvenile respondents at the adjudication stage of 
civil delinquency proceedings because of two factors: (1) juveniles are 
ill-equipped to perform the tasks necessary to defend themselves; and 
(2) the stakes were too high in delinquency proceedings to permit 
juveniles to defend themselves in court without a lawyer.92 In 
delinquency proceedings, the government accuses a juvenile of 
 
 87. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).  
 88. Id. at 69 (“Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in 
the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself 
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the 
aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent 
evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and 
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the 
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.”). 
 89. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938). Despite the categorical approach in federal 
criminal cases, the Supreme Court initially limited the right to appointed counsel outside of federal 
criminal cases to the special circumstances of a particular case. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 466 
(1942). Under this approach, the Supreme Court recognized that youth was a special circumstance 
that favored the appointment of counsel to young criminal defendants. For example, in Wade v. 
Mayo, the Supreme Court held under the special circumstances test that an eighteen-year-old 
defendant’s youth made him incapable of adequately representing himself. 334 U.S. 672, 684 
(1948) (“There are some individuals who, by reason of age, ignorance or mental capacity are 
incapable of representing themselves adequately in a prosecution of a relatively simple nature. This 
incapacity is purely personal and can be determined only by an examination and observation of the 
individual. Where such incapacity is present, the refusal to appoint counsel is a denial of due 
process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.”). Notably, Defendant Wade was 18 years old 
and had prior convictions and thus was “no a stranger to the Court Room.” Id. at 683. Similarly, 
the Supreme Court held that a seventeen-year-old should have been provided counsel before 
pleading guilty to burglary. Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 442 (1948) (“Petitioner was 
young and inexperienced in the intricacies of criminal procedure when he pleaded guilty to crimes 
which carried a maximum sentence of eighty years.”). 
 90. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).  
 91. Id. at 345 (limited only by the defendant’s financial ability to retain his own counsel). 
 92. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1967). 
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conduct that would be criminal if committed by an adult.93 While 
juvenile courts aim for more rehabilitative dispositions for juveniles 
than the punitive focus of criminal courts, the consequences of 
delinquency proceedings can include fines, probation, and prolonged 
detention.94 As the Supreme Court recognized, “[t]he juvenile needs 
the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled 
inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and 
to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it.”95 
Notably, the Supreme Court held that due process demanded counsel 
for juveniles in delinquency proceedings, even though Gerald Gault 
and other juveniles at the time did not face a prosecutor in their 
proceedings.96 The due process right to appointed counsel in 
delinquency proceedings is a categorical one, and does not depend on 
the developmental characteristics of the juvenile before the court 
(subject only, in some states, to a juvenile’s ability to pay).97 
The right to appointed counsel for juveniles applies at transfer 
hearings as well, where juvenile court judges determine whether to 
transfer a delinquency case to adult criminal court.98 Even though a 
transfer hearing does not, by itself, result in any penalties, the Supreme 
Court recognized that the decision to transfer a juvenile’s case from 
juvenile court to criminal court was “critically important,” and 
 
 93. Delinquency proceedings do not, however, result in criminal convictions. See, e.g., CAL. 
WELF. & INST. CODE § 203 (West 2019) (“An order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the juvenile 
court shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose, nor shall a proceeding in the 
juvenile court be deemed a criminal proceeding.”). 
 94. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 731 (West 2019) (detailing dispositional 
alternatives for those adjudicated delinquents, including physical confinement equal to the 
maximum period of imprisonment that could be imposed on an adult for the same offense). 
 95. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)) (“[T]he 
child requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step of the proceedings against him.”). 
 96. Josh Gupta-Kagan, Rethinking Family-Court Prosecutors: Elected and Agency 
Prosecutors and Prosecutorial Discretion in Juvenile Delinquency and Child Protection Cases, 85 
U. CHI. L. REV. 743, 761 (2018) (“From family courts’ origin at the turn of the twentieth century 
to the Supreme Court’s 1967 decision in Gault, family courts had developed a unique system for 
making charging decisions in both child protection and juvenile delinquency cases, which placed 
court staff in decisive roles and excluded prosecutors and other executive-branch officials.”). In 
Gault’s case, he was questioned by the judge. Two probation officers were present, but no 
prosecutor. Today, juvenile delinquency proceedings are presented by the state by trained 
prosecutors. NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS 64 (3d ed. 
2009) (“Entry-level attorneys in the juvenile unit should be as qualified as any entry-level attorney, 
and receive special training regarding juvenile matters.”). 
 97. Some states require proof of indigence before they will provide a court-appointed lawyer 
to a juvenile in delinquency proceedings, while others presume indigence. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 7B-2000 (2013) (“All juveniles shall be conclusively presumed to be indigent . . . .”). 
 98. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966). 
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therefore it was “equally of ‘critical importance’ that the material 
submitted to the judge . . . be subjected . . . to examination, criticism, 
and refutation.”99 The Court held that only counsel for the juvenile 
would ensure that the transfer hearing was fundamentally fair.100 
Appointed counsel for youth in legal proceedings involving “such 
tremendous consequences,” the Court declared, is part of “society’s 
special concern for children.”101 The due process right to appointed 
counsel at transfer hearings is similarly is a categorical one, and does 
not depend on the developmental characteristics of the juvenile before 
the court. 
To best protect juvenile litigants, numerous scholars and expert 
bodies go beyond urging a right to counsel and endorse prohibitions 
on waiver of counsel by juveniles.102 For instance, the Institute for 
Judicial Administration and the American Bar Association Juvenile 
Justice Standards prohibit waiver of counsel by juveniles,103 and both 
the National Juvenile Defender Center and the National Legal Aid and 
Defender Association similarly call for a ban on the waiver of counsel 
by juveniles.104 These groups do so because effective assistance of 
counsel for juveniles is the precursor to a juvenile’s ability to exercise 
all other important rights during the course of the juvenile justice 
process. Moreover, “[f]ew juveniles have the experience and 
understanding to decide meaningfully that the assistance of counsel 
would not be helpful.”105 A growing number of states have followed 
 
 99. Id. at 563. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 554. 
 102. See Mary Berkheiser, The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in the Juvenile 
Courts, 54 FLA. L. REV. 577, 609–622, 650 (2002) (advocating for the prohibition of juvenile 
waiver of counsel based on juveniles’ lack of capacity and public policy, and rejecting concerns 
regarding the violation of juveniles’ right to autonomy); Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in 
Juvenile Court: An Empirical Study of When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1345 (1989) (arguing for a mandatory representation model in 
delinquency court). 
 103. INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. & AM. BAR ASS’N, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS: 
STANDARDS RELATING TO ADJUDICATION 14 (1980); see also Tamar R. Birckhead, The Age of the 
Child: Interrogating Juveniles After Roper v. Simmons, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385, 418–20 
(2008) (arguing that young suspects lack the capacity to waive counsel and be interrogated without 
the presence of an adult). 
 104. AM. COUNCIL OF CHIEF DEFS. AND NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., TEN CORE PRINCIPLES FOR 
PROVIDING QUALITY DELINQUENCY REPRESENTATION THROUGH INDIGENT DEFENSE DELIVERY 
SYSTEMS 1, 2 (2005) (“The indigent defense delivery system should ensure that children do not 
waive appointment of counsel.”). 
 105. INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. & AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 103, at 14 (recommending a 
prohibition on waiver of counsel at pretrial proceedings). 
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these recommendations and restrict or prohibit juveniles from waiving 
their right to counsel.106 
The rest of this Part shows that in the decades since Kent and 
Gault, courts and legislatures have extended the right to appointed 
counsel far beyond the delinquency setting. 
B.  Status Offense Hearings 
The bulk of states provide juveniles a right to appointed counsel 
in status offense hearings.107 Status offenses are non-criminal, non-
delinquent offenses that would not be offenses for an adult.108 They 
include matters like curfew violations, truancy, alcohol or tobacco 
possession, incorrigibility, and running away.109 Disposition can 
include court-ordered services, probation, and out-of-home 
 
 106. These states include: Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-103 (2018) (minors may not waive 
counsel in dependency proceeding)); Illinois (705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405 / 5-170(b) (2018); 705 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-115.5 (1987) (“[A] minor may not waive the right to the assistance of 
counsel in his or her defense [in delinquency proceedings].”)); Iowa (IOWA CODE § 232.11(2) 
(2018) (minors may not waive counsel at detention, adjudicatory, waiver, or dispositional 
hearings)); Kentucky (D.R. v. Commonwealth, 64 S.W.3d 292, 296 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (juvenile 
may not waive counsel unless counsel is first appointed and consulted with)); Michigan (MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 3.915(B) (juvenile may not waive counsel if court determines that best interests of 
juvenile or public require appointment)); New York (N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 249(a) (McKinney 
2018) (juvenile presumed unable to waive counsel in delinquency or person in need of supervision 
proceeding; presumption can be rebutted only with clear and convincing evidence once attorney 
has been appointed)); Pennsylvania (PA. R. JUV. CT. P. 152(A) (juveniles may not waive counsel 
in detention, adjudicatory, transfer, dispositional or probation hearings)); Texas (TEX. FAM. CODE 
ANN. § 51.10(b) (2017) (prohibits juveniles from waiving counsel at any transfer, adjudicatory, 
disposition, detention, or mental health commitment review hearing)); and Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. 
§ 938.23(1m)(a) (2018) (minors under fifteen may not waive counsel)). 
 107. AM. BAR ASS’N, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN STATUS OFFENSE CASES (2010), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/child/PublicDocuments/right_to_counsel
_factsheet.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 108. Literature Review, OJJDP (Sept. 2015), https://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/litreviews 
/Status_Offenders.pdf. 
 109. Id. States use various terms to characterize status offenders: “Children in Need of 
Services,” “Children in Need of Supervision,” “Children in Need of Assistance,” “Youth in Need 
of Intervention,” “Family in Need of Services,” “incorrigible youth,” “unruly youth,” “wayward 
youth” or simply “status offenses.” In some states, status offense petitions fall under the 
delinquency jurisdiction, in others under the dependency jurisdiction. Status offense cases can 
represent a significant percentage of a juvenile court’s caseload. See, e.g., CAL. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, 
JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA 31 (2015), https://oag.ca.gov/cjsc/pubs#juvenileJustice 
(reporting over 11,000 status offense petitions filed in 2015, representing 16.6 percent of all 
petitions filed in juvenile court in 2015). 
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placement.110 Secure detention is strongly disfavored in status offense 
proceedings, but does occur.111 
Consistent with the theory advanced here, thirty-nine states and 
the District of Columbia have laws requiring judges to appoint counsel 
to juveniles in status offense proceedings either mandatorily or under 
certain circumstances, such as when counsel is requested.112 Six 
additional states allows judges to appoint counsel in status offense 
proceedings at their discretion.113 
 
 110. See Sarah Hockenberry & Charles Puzzanchera, Juvenile Court Statistics 2013, 2015 
NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV. JUST. 81 (finding that the court ordered out-of-home placement in 8 percent 
of all adjudicated status offense cases in 2013). 
 111. See 34 U.S.C. § 11133(a)(11)(A) (2012). States holding status offenders in secure 
detention risk losing a significant portion of their juvenile justice block grant awards. Status Offense 
Issues, JJGPS, http://www.jjgps.org/status-offense-issues (last visited Jan 19, 2019). If it is alleged 
that a status offender violated a valid court order, a violation hearing may be held. At that violation 
hearing, secure detention may be imposed. 34 U.S.C. § 11133(a)(11)(A)(i), 11133(a)(23). Federal 
regulations require counsel at such violation hearings. See 28 C.F.R. § 31.303(f)(3)(v)(D) (2018) 
(Status offenders who have allegedly violated a valid order of the court must be afforded “the right 
to legal counsel, and the right to have such counsel appointed by the court if indigent” at the 
violation hearing.). 
 112. Twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws requiring judges to 
appoint counsel to juveniles in status offense proceedings: Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-316 
(2018)); California (CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 634 (West 2018)); Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 19-3-203 (2018)); D.C. (D.C. CODE § 16-2304(a) (2018)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-
402 (2018)); Idaho: (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-514 (2018)); Illinois (705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-5 
(2018)); Indiana (IND. CODE § 31-32-4-2 (2018)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2205 (2018)); 
Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.060 (West 2018)); Maryland (MD. CODE. ANN., CTS. & 
JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-20 (West 2018)); Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 39F (2018)); 
Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.17c(2) (2018) (court shall appoint attorney unless child 
waives right)); Mississippi (MISS. UNIF. R. YOUTH CT. P. 24 (2018)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 41-5-1413 (2017) (counsel mandatory in formal proceedings)); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 62D.030 (2018)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-D:12 (2018)); New Mexico 
(N.M. STAT. § 32A-3B-8 (2019) (counsel mandatory if juvenile over age 14)); New York (N.Y. 
FAM. CT. ACT § 741 (McKinney 2018)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352 (West 2018)); 
Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 2-2-301 (2018)); Pennsylvania (42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 6337 (2018)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 1-41-31 (2002)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 36 (2018)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 26-7A-31 (2018) (court shall appoint 
attorney if child can’t afford)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78A-6-1111 (2018)); Vermont (VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5112 (2017)); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE § 13.32A.192(1)(C) (2018)); 
West Virginia (W. VA. CODE § 49-4-708 (2017)). An additional eleven states provide a qualified 
right to counsel for juveniles in status offense proceedings: Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-
221(A) (2018)); Connecticut (CONN. R. SUP. CT. JUV. § 30a-1(b)(2) (2019)); Iowa (IOWA CODE 
§ 232.89 (2019)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3306 (2017)); Minnesota (MINN. R. JUV. 
DELINQ. P. 3.02 (2018)); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-272 (2018)); New Jersey: (N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2A:4A-39 (West 2018)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-26 (2017)); Texas (TEX. 
FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.10 (West 2017)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266(C) (2018)); 
Wyoming (WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-422(a) (2018)). 
 113. See Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010 (2018)); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-87(a) 
(2018)); Louisiana (LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 810 (2018)); Missouri (MO. SUP. CT. R. 115.02 
(2018)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-126 (2018)); Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. 
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C.  Dependency Proceedings 
Every state has provisions for appointing a lawyer to juveniles in 
dependency proceedings.114 In dependency proceedings (also known 
as child welfare, or abuse and neglect, proceedings), the state brings 
allegations of abuse or neglect against parents or guardians. 
Dependency proceedings do not result in any finding of wrongdoing 
by the minor. Nevertheless, dependency proceedings can result in a 
child’s temporary or permanent removal from her family to foster 
homes and group residential institutions.115 
Recognizing the importance of the juvenile’s interests in the 
outcome of such proceedings, thirty states and the District of 
Columbia mandate appointing a lawyer for juveniles in dependency 
proceedings.116 Another fourteen have a qualified right, providing a 
 
§ 938.23(1m)(a) (2018) (The court has discretion to appoint counsel in a “youth in need of 
intervention” case but a child must be represented by counsel before she can be placed outside the 
home.)). 
 114. Federal law has long required that all minors have, at least, a guardian ad litem (GAL) in 
dependency proceedings. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii) (2018). A GAL need not be an attorney, 
and for many reasons is not the equivalent of an attorney. Id. A primary difference is that guardians 
ad litem are typically expected to advocate for the minor’s best interests, as perceived by the GAL, 
instead of being client-directed as in the typical attorney-client relationship. Id. While this 
undoubtedly makes sense for infant clients, it is increasingly problematic as the age of the juvenile 
respondent increases. 
 115. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200–01, 201 n.9 (1989) 
(noting that placement in foster care can be substantially similar to “incarceration, 
institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty”); see also Jennifer K. Pokempner 
et al., The Legal Significance of Adolescent Development on the Right to Counsel: Establishing the 
Constitutional Right to Counsel for Teens in Child Welfare Matters and Assuring a Meaningful 
Right to Counsel in Delinquency Matters, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529, 537–38 (2012) 
(explaining that a link exists between healthy child development and consistent, supportive 
relationships, which is disrupted by dependency proceedings, where “[r]emoval from an 
adolescent’s family, friends, and community is at stake”). 
 116. Alabama (ALA. CODE §§ 12-15-102(10), 12-15-304(a), 26-14-11 (2018)); Arkansas 
(ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-27-316(f), 9-27-401 (2018)); Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-1-
103(59), 19-3-203(1) (2018)); Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-129(c)(2), 46b-136, 51-296 
(2018)); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 2504(f) (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 9007A 
(2018)); District of Columbia (D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2304(b)(5) (West 2018)); Georgia (GA. CODE 
ANN. § 15-11-103 (2018)); Iowa (IOWA CODE §§ 232.89(2), 232B.5(16) (2019)); Kansas (KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 38-2205 (2018)); Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 610.060, 620.100(1)(a) (West 
2018)); Louisiana (LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 607 (2018)); Maryland (MD. CODE. ANN., CTS. & 
JUD. PROC. § 3-813 (2017)); Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119 § 39F (2012)); Michigan 
(MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 712A.17c(7), 722.630 (2017); MICH. CT. R. 3.915(B) (2019)); Mississippi 
(MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-201, (2009); MISS. UNIF. R. YOUTH CT. PRAC. 13(a) (2018)); Missouri 
(MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 210.160, 211.211 (West 2018)); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-272 
(2018)); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. § 432B.420 (2013)); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:6-8.21, 
9:6-8.23, 30:4C-15.4, 30:4C-85(a)(2) (West 2018)); New York (N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35(7) 
(McKinney 2018); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 241, 249(a), 1120(b) (McKinney 2018)); North Carolina 
(N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-601 (2018)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. tit. 10a, § 1-4-306 (West 2018)); 
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lawyer under certain conditions, such as when parental rights have 
been terminated117 or when the juvenile is over a certain age.118 The 
remaining six states permit, but do not require, appointed counsel for 
minors in dependency proceedings.119 
In those minority of jurisdictions where appointing a lawyer is not 
mandatory, courts often ensure that minors are represented by 
appointed counsel. For example, California law provides that, in 
dependency proceedings, “the court shall appoint counsel for the child 
or nonminor dependent, unless the court finds that the child or 
nonminor dependent would not benefit from the appointment of 
counsel.”120 Despite the discretionary nature of the right to appointed 
counsel, dependency courts rarely, if ever, invoke this provision to 
deny appointed counsel to a child of any age.121 
Because every state has statutory provisions regarding the 
appointment of counsel for children in dependency proceedings, the 
Supreme Court has never had occasion to decide whether due process 
requires the appointment of counsel to children in dependency 
proceedings. A number of state and federal courts, however, have held 
that minors have a right to counsel under the due process clause of a 
 
Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.195 (West 2003) (counsel must be appointed upon request)); 
Pennsylvania (42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6311 (2018), PA. R. JUV. CT. P. 1151 (2019)); South Dakota 
(S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 26-7A-31, 26-8A-18 (2018)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1-
126, 37-1-149 (2018)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78A-6-317, 78A-6-1111, 78A-6-902(2) (West 
2018)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5112 (2017); VT. R. FAM. P. 6(b) (2018)); Virginia 
(VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266(A) (2010)); West Virginia (W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 49-4-601(a), 29-
21-2 (2018)); Wyoming (WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-211 (2018)). 
 117. Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-221 (West 2018)); Florida (FLA. STAT. § 39.01305 
(2018); FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.217)); Illinois (705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405 / 1-5(1) (2007)); Minnesota 
(MINN. STAT. § 260C.163(3)(b) (2018); S. 1386, 90th Leg., 2017–2018 (Mn. 2017)); Montana 
(MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 41-3-425, 47-1-104(4) (2018)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 169-C:10 (2018)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-20-26, 27-20-48.4(4) (2017)); Ohio 
(OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352 (West 2018); (OHIO JUV. R. 4(A), (C)(1)); Rhode Island (R.I. 
GEN. LAWS §§ 40.1-5-8(d)(2), 40-11-7.1(b)(3) (2018); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28.2-3(4) (2018); R.I. 
R. JUV. P. §§ 15(c)(3), 18(c)(3)); Texas (TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.012 (West 2017)); 
Washington (WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.100 (2017)); Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. § 48.23(1m) (2019)). 
 118. See IDAHO CODE § 16-1614(2) (2009) (providing a right to appointed counsel for those 12 
and older in dependency proceedings); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-10(C) (1978) (providing a right 
to appointed counsel for those 14 and older in dependency proceedings); KING CTY. L. JU. C.R. 2.4 
(providing a right to appointed counsel for those 12 and older in dependency proceedings). 
 119. Alaska (ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.10.050, 47.10.010 (2018); ALASKA CHILD IN NEED OF AID 
R. 12(b)(3)); California (CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317(c) (West 2018)); Hawaii (HAW. REV. 
STAT. §§ 587A-17(a) (2018)); Indiana (IND. CODE § 31-32-4-2(b) (2018)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 22, § 4005(1) (2010); ME. R. GUARDIANS AD LITEM 2); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 63-7-1620 (2018)). 
 120. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317(c)(1). 
 121. The author’s research turned up no instances. 
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state’s constitution in dependency proceedings. For example, a 
Georgia court found a due process right to counsel in dependency 
proceedings because of the fundamental liberty interests at stake and 
the state’s parens patriae interest in protecting children could only be 
adequately ensured if the child is represented by counsel throughout 
the proceedings.122 Similarly, an Alabama court found a statute that 
did not provide for the appointment of independent counsel to 
represent a child in a neglect proceeding violated due process.123 A 
New Jersey court concluded that the due process clause of the federal 
and New Jersey Constitutions include a right to appointed counsel for 
minors in dependency proceedings “to protect the interests of a minor 
incapable of speaking for himself.”124 
In civil delinquency, status offense, and child welfare 
proceedings, courts and legislatures have agreed that, given the stakes 
of those proceedings, the developmental characteristics of youth, and 
the state’s parens patriae obligation to secure a child’s best interests, 
fairness demands that child litigants be provided with counsel in those 
proceedings. 
D.  Termination of Parental Rights 
Proceedings to terminate parental rights can “sever completely 
and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child.”125 While 
the proceeding primarily concerns the right held by the parent, the 
interests of the minor in termination proceedings are likewise 
fundamental. Not only can the proceedings terminate the legal 
connection between a parent and child, they often effectively end the 
parent-child relationship.126 Because of the significant interests at 
stake, courts across the country have acknowledged that minors whose 
parents face termination of their parental rights “are entitled to and 
 
 122. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1356–62 (N.D. Ga. 2005). 
 123. Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 780 (M.D. Ala. 1976); see also In re Jamie TT, 599 
N.Y.S.2d 892, 894–95 (App. Div. 1993) (“[T]he Due Process Clauses of the Federal and State 
Constitutions . . . mandate that there be some form of legal representation of [a child’s] interests in 
the proceedings on the [abuse] petition [brought against the parent].”). 
 124. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. Wandell, 382 A.2d 711, 713 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. Rel. 
Ct. 1978); In re Dependency of J.A., No. 45134-4-II, 2014 WL 2601713 (Wash. Ct. App. 
June 10, 2014) (holding that due process demanded an attorney for the child because a non-attorney 
representative could not adequately protect the legal interests of the child). 
 125. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982). 
 126. See Curnow ex rel. Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(recognizing that “a child’s interest in her relationship with a parent is sufficiently weighty by itself 
to constitute a cognizable liberty interest”). 
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need the assistance of counsel.”127 As the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court put it, “[t]he decision whether to terminate is of 
enormous consequence to the child. The child cannot have a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard in a contested proceeding without 
the assistance of counsel, regardless whether the case is initiated by 
the department or other agency or by a private party.128 
The majority of states require appointed counsel for the minor in 
TPR proceedings,129 and another sixteen have a qualified right to 
appointed counsel.130 
 
 127. In re Christina M., 877 A.2d 941, 950 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005); see also In re 
Adoption/Guardianship No. A91-71A, 640 A.2d 1085, 1095 (Md. 1994) (finding the need for 
counsel in termination proceedings to represent the interest of the juvenile “compelling”). 
 128. In re Meaghan, 961 N.E.2d 110, 113 (Mass. 2012) (also acknowledging children’s right 
to appointed counsel “in a variety of circumstances where the parent-child relationship is at stake”). 
 129. Mandatory right to appointed counsel in privately and state-initiated adoption proceedings: 
Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-121(a)(1), 46b-129a(2)(A), 46b-136 (2019)); Louisiana 
(LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. arts. 1016, 1244.1(B) (2018)); Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, 
§ 29 (2011); In re Meaghan, 961 N.E.2d 110 (Mass. 2012)); Missouri (MO. ANN. STAT. § 453.025 
(2004); MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.211 (West 2018); MO. R. 30 CIR R. 22.1). Mandatory right to 
appointed counsel in state-initiated termination of parental rights proceedings: Alabama (ALA. 
CODE § 12-15-304(a) (West 2018)); Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-602 (LexisNexis 2018)); 
Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 2504(f) (2018)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-262 
(2018)); Iowa (IOWA CODE § 232.113 (2019)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2205 (West 2018)); 
Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-307(b) (West 2018)); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 712A.17c(7) (2017), MICH. CT. R. 3.915(B)(2)); Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-201(1) 
(2004)); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-272(2)-3 (2016)); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 30:4C-15.4 (West 2018)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-10(C) (2005) (minors aged 
14 or older)); New York (N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 741 (McKinney 2018); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35(7) 
(McKinney 2018)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-601 (2018)); Pennsylvania (23 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 2313(a) (2018)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-18 (2018)); 
Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-149 (2012)); Texas (TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.012 (West 
2017)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266(A) (2010)); West Virginia (W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-
21-2 (West 2018)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-1111 (West 2018)). Mandatory right to 
appointed counsel in privately initiated adoption proceedings: Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, 
§ 3-201 (2018)). 
 130. Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-221(A) (2018)); California (CAL. FAM. CODE § 7861 
(West 2018)); Florida (FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.217 (mandatory in certain cases pursuant to H.R. 561, 
2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014))); Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 16-1614 (2009)); Illinois (705 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 405 / 1-5 (2007)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. § 260C.163(3)(b) (2018)); Montana 
(MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-425 (2018)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:10 
(2018)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-26 (2017)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, 
§ 2-2-301(D) (2018)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-2560 (A)–(B) (2008)); Vermont 
(VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5112 (2017)); Washington (WASH. RULE JUV. CT. R. 9.2(c)(1)); 
Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. § 48.23(1m) (2019)); Ohio (In re Williams, 805 N.E.2d 1110, 1111, 1113 
(Ohio 2004)); Oregon (In re D., 547 P.2d 175 (Or. Ct. App. 1976)). 
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E.  Judicial Bypass Hearings 
Another civil proceeding in which juvenile litigants have a right 
to appointed counsel is a non-adversarial judicial bypass hearing. 
Judicial bypass hearings must be available if a state requires a minor 
to notify or obtain consent from one or both parents before she can 
receive an abortion.131 These proceedings are not adversarial, do not 
result in any finding of wrongdoing by the minor, and there is no 
possibility of detention or similar punishment. Nevertheless, of those 
states that provide judicial bypass procedures for minors seeking an 
abortion, all enable the appointment of counsel to the minor. 
In over three quarters of the states that provide judicial bypass 
hearings (thirty out of thirty-seven), juveniles have a statutory right to 
appointed counsel in such hearings.132 Courts recognize that the right 
to counsel is essential to protect the pregnant juvenile’s right to receive 
an abortion.133 Four states have a qualified right to appointed counsel 
 
 131. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (introducing the requirement of bypass hearings). 
 132. Alabama (ALA. CODE § 26-21-4(b) (West 2018)); Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.030(d) 
(2018)); Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152(D) (2018)); Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-
16-809(1)(B) (2018)); Florida (FLA. STAT. § 390.01114(4)(a) (2018)); Georgia: (GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 15-11-684(a) (2018)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 18-609A(3) (2004)); Illinois (750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 70 / 25(b) (West 2009)); Indiana (IND. CODE § 16-34-2-4(e) (2017)); Iowa (IOWA CODE 
§ 135L.3(3)(b) (2018); IOWA CT. R. 8.24); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705(b) (2014)); 
Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.732(3)(c) (West 2018)); Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 112, § 12S (2019)); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.904(2)(e) (2018); MICH. CT. R. 
3.615(F)); Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-55(2) (West 2018)); Missouri (MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 188.028(2)(1) (2018)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-509 (2017)); Nebraska (NEB. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 71-6903(7) (West 2018)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132:34(II)(a) 
(2018)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.8(c) (2011)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2151.85(B)(2) (West 2018)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-740.3(B) (2018)); 
Pennsylvania (18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206(e) (1992)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-
41-32(3) (2018)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-7.1 (2019)); Tennessee (TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 37-10-304(c)(1) (2018)); Texas (TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.003(e) (West 2017)); 
Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(W) (West 2018)); West Virginia (W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-4(d) 
(2017)); Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. § 48.23(1m)(cm) (2018)). Maine no longer requires parental 
consent prior to seeking an abortion. A statutory procedure remains in place for a minor to seek 
judicial approval for the abortion, and that procedure contains a right to counsel for the 
minor. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1597-A(6)(A) (2018). Judicial bypass proceedings are 
not required in states that do not require parental consent. 
 133. Planned Parenthood v. LaWall, 189 F. Supp. 2d 975, 981 (D. Ariz. 2001) (“[T]he minor’s 
right to establish maturity is sufficiently protected by her statutory right to counsel.”); In re 
Anonymous, 531 So. 2d 901, 904 (Ala. 1988) (“[T]he minor’s conditional right to exercise her 
constitutional choice of an abortion is further protected by her right of legal counsel.”); In re T.W., 
551 So. 2d 1186, 1196 (Fla. 1989) (“In [parental consent hearings] wherein a minor can be wholly 
deprived of authority to exercise her fundamental right to privacy [by obtaining an abortion], 
counsel is required under our state constitution.”); In re Moe, 523 N.E.2d 794, 795 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1988) (“Counsel for the applicant, with foreknowledge of the case, may be able to draw out salient 
information which the judge’s questioning will miss.”). 
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in judicial bypass hearings.134 As a result, in over ninety percent of 
judicial bypass states, the minor has a right to appointed counsel by 
default, by asking for one, or by petitioning for a hearing before the 
court. In the remaining three states that have judicial bypass hearings, 
the right to appointed counsel is discretionary.135 
F.  Other 
In a variety of other contexts, child litigants have a right to 
counsel. Sometimes, it is because they are in a proceeding in which all 
litigants are entitled to counsel, such as mental health commitment 
proceedings.136 In other proceedings, such as civil protection order 
proceedings that may lead to criminal violations, courts found that the 
characteristics of youth supported a due process right to appointed 
counsel.137 At other times, legislatures have granted child litigants a 
right to appointed counsel to protect the child’s interest in family 
relationships.138 
G.  No Right to Counsel 
There are at least two types of proceedings in which child litigants 
do not have a right to appointed counsel: student discipline hearings 
and immigration removal proceedings. 
 
 134. Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1784(e) (2011)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. 
§ 144.343, subd. 6 (2004)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-509 (2017) (counsel assigned 
upon request)); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. § 442.255 (2017) (minor has a right to appointed counsel 
if the judge initially denies the minor’s request following an interview, and the minor files a petition 
with the court requesting a formal hearing)). 
 135. Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-37.5-107(2)(b) (2010)); Utah (UTAH R. JUV. P. 60(c)); 
Wyoming (WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-6-118(b)(iii) (2018)). 
 136. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-529(B) (2018) (requiring appointment of counsel for all 
persons facing civil commitment for a mental disorder); In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286, 1296 (Cal. 
1977) (applying Gault to hold that children are entitled to counsel in civil commitment 
proceedings); see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-221(C) (West 2018) (providing a right to 
appointed counsel to juveniles in “any court appearance which may result in institutionalization or 
mental health hospitalization”). 
 137. In re D.L., 937 N.E.2d 1042, 1047 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010) (stating that the juvenile’s “young 
age alone would indicate that he should have been appointed counsel” in civil protection order 
proceedings that may lead to criminal violations). 
 138. OR. REV. STAT. § 107.425(b) (2011) (right to counsel for children involved in divorce 
proceedings upon request); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 594(b) (2018) (mandating courts to appoint 
counsel for a minor child when the child is called as a witness in a divorce or annulment 
proceeding). 
(9) 52.4_LAPP (DO NOT DELETE) 1/6/2020  4:41 PM 
490 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:463 
1.  Student Discipline Hearings 
Courts and legislatures have recognized the tremendous 
importance of education in a child’s development.139 Consistent with 
this, courts have recognized that a child’s “legitimate entitlement to a 
public education . . . [is] a property interest protected by the Due 
Process clause.”140 Therefore, when school officials move to exclude 
a juvenile from the classroom, for either a short-term suspension or an 
expulsion, the juvenile has a right to some process. The Supreme 
Court set the procedural floor for school suspensions quite low when 
it held that due process only required an informal hearing in which the 
child has the opportunity to “present his side of the story.”141 The 
Court held that due process does not require a right to confront and 
cross-examine witnesses, or a right on behalf of the student to call his 
own witnesses to verify his version of the incident, much less that the 
government provide the child with a lawyer at the suspension 
hearing.142 According to the Court, such rights risked overwhelming 
administrative resources, and the Court worried that “escalating 
[suspension hearings’] formality and adversary nature may not only 
make it too costly as a regular disciplinary tool but also destroy its 
effectiveness as part of the teaching process.”143 
The Court did concede that suspensions lasting longer than ten 
days “may require more formal procedures” to satisfy due process.144 
And in many jurisdictions across the country, authorities have 
imposed procedural requirements above and beyond the minimal floor 
 
 139. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975) (“[T]he total exclusion from the educational 
process for more than a trivial period . . . is a serious event in the life of the suspended child.”); 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“[E]ducation is perhaps the most important 
function of state and local governments.”). Education is not, however, considered a fundamental 
right under the U.S. Constitution. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 
(1973). Some states have decreed that education is a fundamental right in their state constitution, 
or state courts have interpreted education under the state constitution to be a fundamental right. 
See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1; Sch. Dist. 
of Wilkinsburg v. Wilkinsburg Educ. Ass’n, 667 A.2d 5, 9 (Pa. 1995) (“[P]ublic education in 
Pennsylvania is a fundamental right.”); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W. 2d 186, 212 
(Ky. 1989) (“A child’s right to an adequate education is a fundamental one under our 
Constitution.”). 
 140. Goss, 419 U.S. at 574. 
 141. Id. at 581. 
 142. Indeed, the Supreme Court did not even require that states afford the child the opportunity 
to secure counsel. Id. at 583. 
 143. Id. at 583. 
 144. Id. at 584. 
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set in Goss v. Lopez (1975).145 None, however, afford a juvenile facing 
exclusion from school a right to appointed counsel.146 
To the extent that expulsions and short-term suspensions do not 
involve a complete denial of access to public education, however, it is 
arguably consistent with the theory advanced here. When students are 
expelled from a school, they typically retain their right to a public 
education, and are provided an alternative school placement.147 When 
students are suspended from school, they may not attend school on 
site, but still may receive work from the school so that they do not fall 
behind during the suspension.148 What is lost as a result of an 
expulsion or suspension is the ability to receive education at a 
particular school, not the right to a public education. Nevertheless, the 
lack of a right to counsel in school suspension and expulsion hearings 
is, at the very least, troubling, and given the stakes and limited abilities 
of youth to assert their rights and interests, arguably violates due 
process.149 
2.  Immigration Proceedings 
Tens of thousands of minors appear as respondents in 
immigration removal proceedings annually. According to the 
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), the number of 
juveniles in immigration court removal proceedings had been 
approximately 60,000 annually for the last few years.150 In Fiscal Year 
(FY) 2018, the number reached the highest ever recorded. As of 
November 2018, the United States had brought removal proceedings 
 
 145. 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Waterstone, supra note 15, at 487 (“[M]ost states have enacted 
hearing procedures for long-term school exclusions that allow students an opportunity to introduce 
evidence, confront witnesses, and make statements on their own behalf.”). 
 146. Id. at 488. 
 147. This is not always true. Id. at 492 (identifying New Mexico, North Carolina, and 
Wisconsin as states where students are not necessarily offered an alternative educational placement 
during an expulsion or suspension). 
 148. At least, this is the way it is supposed to happen. Often, suspended students do not receive 
assignments during their suspension. 
 149. Waterstone, supra note 15, at 477. 
 150. Juveniles — Immigration Court Deportation Proceedings, supra note 3. 
(9) 52.4_LAPP (DO NOT DELETE) 1/6/2020  4:41 PM 
492 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:463 
against over 247,000 juveniles in FY 2018.151 Some are as young as 
two years old.152 
In immigration removal proceedings, Congress has declared that 
respondents have “the privilege of being represented, at no expense to 
the Government, by counsel of the [respondent’s] choosing.”153 There 
is no carve-out from this rule for child respondents. For FY 2018, two-
thirds of juvenile respondents in removal proceedings were not 
represented.154 
While some state and local jurisdictions with large immigrant 
populations, including the states of New York and California, and 
cities such as San Francisco, Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., New 
York City, Baltimore, and Austin, have taken steps designed to ensure 
that non-citizens are provided legal representation in removal 
proceedings,155 courts have yet to recognize that due process demands 
appointed counsel for every child litigant. Indeed, over the years, 
courts have rejected both Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims to 
appointed counsel in removal proceedings.156 And while several 
 
 151. Id. For FY 2018, case counts in TRAC’s Immigration Court “juvenile cases” include all 
juveniles. Unlike prior years, they do not distinguish between children who arrive unaccompanied 
and those who arrive as part of a family unit. Distinguishing Unaccompanied Children from 
Children in Family Units, TRAC IMMIGRATION (June 8, 2018), 
https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/juvenile/note.html. 
 152. See Vivian Yee & Miriam Jordan, Migrant Children in Search of Justice: A 2-Year-Old’s 
Day in Immigration Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/08/us/migrant-children-family-separation-court.html. 
 153. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012). 
 154. Juveniles — Immigration Court Deportation Proceedings, supra note 3 (of 228,874 
juveniles, 153,079 were not represented). From 2014 to 2016, approximately two-thirds of juvenile 
respondents in immigration proceedings were represented by a lawyer. Id. (63 percent represented 
in FY 2014, 66 percent represented in FY 2015 and FY 2016). But as the number of juveniles in 
removal proceedings has grown, so too has the number and percentage of those who do not obtain 
counsel. The figure for FY 2017 was 57 percent unrepresented (35,197 of 61,917). Prior to the 
recent spike in the number of removal proceedings brought against juveniles, more juveniles than 
not managed to secure some form of representation. 
 155. See New York State Becomes First in the Nation to Provide Lawyers for All Immigrants 
Detained and Facing Deportation, VERA INST. JUST. (Apr. 7, 2017), 
https://www.vera.org/newsroom/press-releases/new-york-state-becomes-first-in-the-nation-to-
provide-lawyers-for-all-immigrants-detained-and-facing-deportation; see also Jennifer M. Chacón, 
Privatized Immigration Enforcement, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 6 (2017) (noting that “some 
states and localities with large numbers of noncitizen residents have begun to provide funding for 
immigrant representation”). 
 156. See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 
(1984) (holding that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel to criminal defendants does not 
apply to respondents in civil removal proceedings); Al-Saka v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 427, 434 (6th 
Cir. 2018) (“[T]he Due Process Clause does not guarantee a right to government-provided counsel 
in [removal proceedings].”); Rafiyev v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 853, 861 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[T]here is 
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federal courts of appeals have observed that, in particular cases, due 
process may demand a right to counsel in removal proceedings,157 no 
court has found that due process required counsel at government 
expense in the case before the court. 
Several recent decisions have addressed a minor respondent’s 
procedural rights in removal proceedings, including a right to 
appointed counsel. The Ninth Circuit held in Flores-Chavez v. 
Ashcroft (2004)158 that children cannot accept service of a charging 
document because “minors generally cannot appreciate or navigate the 
rules of or rights surrounding final proceedings that significantly 
impact their liberty interests.”159 Relatedly, in Jie Lin v. Ashcroft 
(2004),160 the Ninth Circuit found a due process violation when an 
asylum hearing was conducted despite minor’s counsel’s insufficient 
preparation for the hearing.161 The case involved a fourteen-year-old 
who “could not speak English, and had no knowledge of the American 
legal system.”162 He had retained counsel, but counsel did little in the 
way of preparation or advocacy during the hearing.163 Indeed, the 
representation was so deficient that the court stated that proceeding 
under the circumstances “flirted with denial of counsel altogether.”164 
The court noted that “minors are entitled to trained legal assistance so 
their rights may be fully protected.”165 Because it was a “near-certain 
prospect” that the minor respondent was “unable to present his case 
fully and fairly if unrepresented,”166 the Ninth Circuit found that the 
 
no constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment to effective assistance of counsel in a removal 
proceeding.”). 
 157. See Michelson v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 897 F.2d 465, 468 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(noting that a due process claim to appointed counsel could be shown where sufficient prejudice 
from the lack of counsel was shown); United States v. Campos-Asencio, 822 F.2d 506, 509 (5th 
Cir. 1987) (holding that a respondent in removal proceedings “has a right to counsel if the absence 
of counsel would violate due process under the fifth amendment”). 
 158. 362 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 159. Id. at 1160. 
 160. 377 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 161. Id. at 1024–27. 
 162. Id. at 1019. 
 163. The Ninth Circuit found that the minor’s counsel had limited, if any, contact with her 
client, unreasonably failed to investigate and present the factual and legal basis of the minor’s 
asylum claim, failed to appear in court for the asylum hearing, conducted little advocacy via her 
telephonic appearance, and failed to pursue a direct appeal to rectify the errors made at the hearing. 
Id. at 1024–26. 
 164. Id. at 1033. 
 165. Id. (quoting Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
 166. Id. 
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decision to proceed while the minor was effectively unrepresented 
violated due process.167 
These cases provide strong support for a due process right to 
appointed counsel for child litigants. Although Flores-Chavez is not 
about counsel, one doubts how children who lack the competence to 
accept service in immigration cases may simultaneously be able to 
represent themselves in immigration court against trained prosecutors. 
And Jie-Lin declared that “minors are entitled to trained legal 
assistance so their rights may be fully protected,”168 and found the 
effective denial of counsel to amount to a violation of due process.169 
 
 167. Id. at 1033–34 (“[T]he IJ could not let [the minor’s] hearing proceed without counsel.”); 
see also Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder (Franco-Gonzalez II), No. 10-cv-02211-DMG-DTB, 2013 WL 
3674492 (C.D. Cal. April 23, 2013) (holding that non-citizens who are not competent to represent 
themselves by reason of a serious mental disorder or defect and who are detained during their 
removal proceedings are entitled to the appointment of a qualified representative). The court held 
that those respondents are not able to meaningfully exercise their rights under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act to “examine the evidence against the alien, to present evidence on the alien’s own 
behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government.” Franco-Gonzalez II, 2013 
WL 3674492 at *4. The court located the right not in the Due Process clause, but instead in section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits discrimination against those with disabilities. Id. at 
*3; 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2017). Hewing to the doctrine of avoiding constitutional questions when it is 
unnecessary to reach them, the court did not reach the plaintiffs’ claim for a right to appointed 
counsel under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Franco-Gonzalez II, 2013 
WL 3674492 at *9. As interpreted by the Supreme Court, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
requires than an individual with disabilities be provided with meaningful access to the benefit 
offered by the government. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 309 (1985). The court found that 
plaintiffs were “unable to meaningfully access the benefit offered—in this case, full participation 
in their removal and detention proceedings—because of their disability.” Franco-Gonzalez II, 2013 
WL 3674492 at *4. Rather than require the appointment of counsel, however, the court required 
the appointment of a “qualified representative.” Id. at *3. The court defined “qualified 
representative” as “(1) an attorney, (2) a law student or law graduate directly supervised by a 
retained attorney, or (3) an accredited representative, all as defined in 8 C.F.R. 1292.1.” Franco-
Gonzalez v. Holder (Franco-Gonzalez I), 828 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 2011). Federal 
regulations define an “accredited representative” as “a person who is approved by the Board to 
represent aliens before the Board, the Immigration Courts, and DHS. He or she must be a person 
of good moral character who works for a specific nonprofit religious, charitable, social service, or 
similar organization which has been recognized by the Board to represent aliens.” BD. OF 
IMMIGRATION APPEALS, BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS PRACTICE MANUAL 25 (last revised 
Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1103051/download. To receive 
accreditation, an individual must demonstrate that he or she works for a qualifying organization 
that “has at its disposal adequate knowledge, information, and experience” in immigration law and 
procedure and the qualifying organization must “set forth the nature and extent of the proposed 
representative’s experience and knowledge of immigration and naturalization law and 
procedure.” 8 C.F.R. § 1292.2(a), (d) (2017). 
 168. Jie Lin, 377 F.3d at 1033 (quoting Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th 
Cir. 1997)). 
 169. Id. at 1027. 
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Nevertheless, no federal court has held that minor respondents in 
removal proceedings have a categorical due process right to 
counsel.170 In the most recent, and directly on point, case, a minor who 
appeared in immigration court accompanied only by his mother 
asserted on appeal a due process right to appointed counsel.171 Sitting 
en banc, the Ninth Circuit declined to address the constitutional 
claim.172 Judge Paez authored a concurrence that would have decided 
the right to appointed counsel claim, and would have recognized the 
right under the Mathews balancing test.173 
PART III:  THE THEORY APPLIED TO IMMIGRATION REMOVAL 
PROCEEDINGS 
Part I articulated a theory for a due process right to counsel for 
child litigants. It drew on society’s and the law’s longstanding and 
renewed special concern for children, and the distinguishing 
characteristics of youth. Part II showed that the law regarding the right 
of child litigants to counsel generally coheres with the theory 
advanced here. One notable exception, involving tens of thousands of 
child litigants annually, are immigration removal (deportation) 
proceedings. This Part argues that, because immigration removal 
proceedings are complex, adversarial proceedings in which significant 
liberty interests are at stake, and the respondent faces a trained 
 
 170. Cf. Partial Judgment and Permanent Injunction, Franco-Gonzalez II, No. 10-cv-02211-
DMG-DTB, 2013 WL 3674492 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013) (holding that non-citizens in removal 
proceedings who are incompetent due to mental disabilities are entitled to a qualified representative 
as a reasonable accommodation under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act). 
 171. C.J.L.G. v. Barr, 923 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc). 
 172. Id. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the immigration court because the immigration 
judge failed to advise the minor respondent that he was apparently eligible for a form of relief from 
removal. Id. The court avoided deciding the fully-briefed right to appointed counsel claim by noting 
that C.J.L.G. had since secured counsel and would be represented before the Immigration Court on 
remand. Id. Strikingly, C.J.L.G.’s case demonstrates exactly why child respondents need lawyers 
to ensure the fairness of their proceedings. Neither the presence of a friendly adult nor the 
immigration judge’s duty to develop the record were sufficient to prevent error. Moreover, if 
C.J.L.G. had not secured counsel after he was ordered deported, the error in his case would have 
never come to light. He would have been just another child deported after an unfair hearing. 
Nevertheless, because of C.J.L.G.’s fortune in securing a lawyer, and the Ninth Circuit’s 
unwillingness to address the right to appointed counsel issues, thousands of children who do not 
share C.J.L.G.’s good luck will continue to go without a lawyer in proceedings that are just as likely 
as his to be unfair. 
 173. Id. at 629 (Paez, J., concurring). 
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prosecutor, fairness demands that child respondents be provided with 
counsel.174 
A.  Significant Interests at Stake 
Numerous courts have acknowledged that “[t]he private liberty 
interests involved in deportation proceedings are indisputably 
substantial.”175 According to the Supreme Court, “[t]he impact of 
deportation upon the life of an alien is often as great if not greater than 
the imposition of a criminal sentence.”176 Removal proceedings, like 
delinquency proceedings, can involve secure detention pending 
resolution of the case.177 They can result not only in separation of the 
juvenile from family and community, but in deportation, a 
consequence more severe than any that a juvenile court can impose.178 
The severity of the potential sanction is magnified in cases involving 
children seeking asylum, where removal may place their lives in 
danger.179 In short, like delinquency proceedings and dependency 
proceedings,180 where juveniles have a right to appointed counsel, 
substantial liberty interests are at stake for child respondents in 
removal proceedings.181 
 
 174. Other scholars have asserted a similar claim, though typically arguing for a right to 
appointed counsel within the context of the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test. See, e.g., 
Representation in Removal Proceedings, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1658, 1678 (2013) (“The group with 
the strongest claim to a right to appointed counsel based on Supreme Court precedent is juvenile 
noncitizens.”); Linda K. Hill, The Right to be Heard: Voicing the Due Process Right to Counsel 
for Unaccompanied Alien Children, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 41, 44 (2011); Good, supra note 
15, at 156. 
 175. See, e.g., Flores-Chavez v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1150, 1160 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 176. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 164 (1945). 
 177. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 298 (1993) (noting existence of agreement limiting, but 
not prohibiting, secure detention of child immigrants); see also Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Answering 
Brief at 2–8, Flores v. Sessions, 862 F.3d 863 (2017) (No. 17-55208) (describing 
immigrant children held in secure custody pending their removal proceedings). 
 178. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010) (recognizing “[t]he severity of 
deportation—the equivalent of banishment or exile”). 
 179. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) 
(“Deportation is always a harsh measure; it is all the more replete with danger when the alien makes 
a claim that he or she will be subject to death or persecution if forced to return to his or her home 
country.”). 
 180. Compare Wash. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Luak (In re Dependency of MSR & 
TSR), 271 P.3d 234, 242 (Wash. 2012) (en banc) (“[T]he child in a dependency or termination 
proceeding may well face the loss of a physical liberty . . . .”), with Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 
276, 284 (1922) (Deportation “deprives [the individual] of liberty” and may “result also in loss of 
both property and life, or all that makes life worth living.”), and Bridges, 326 U.S. at 154 
(acknowledging that in deportation proceedings, “the liberty of an individual is at stake”). 
 181. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 154. 
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Yet, the right to appointed counsel for juveniles is not limited to 
the juvenile delinquency context. As shown above, child litigants have 
a right to appointed counsel in a variety of civil proceedings, some of 
which do not carry the potential for detention or family separation.182 
Removal proceedings involve no less significant interests than those 
in which child litigants have a right to appointed counsel. 
B.  Adversarial Proceeding Against Trained Government Counsel 
Immigration removal proceedings are adversarial proceedings—
they are initiated with a charging document, in which the government 
asserts and must prove allegations against the respondent. In removal 
proceedings, the government presents its case through trained legal 
counsel. Numerous courts have considered the adversarial nature of 
the proceedings in deciding whether due process requires appointment 
of counsel.183 As the Supreme Court observed, “[w]here an 
individual’s liberty interest assumes sufficiently weighty 
constitutional significance, and the State by a formal and adversarial 
proceeding seeks to curtail that interest, the right to counsel may be 
necessary to ensure fundamental fairness.”184 Moreover, the presence 
of government counsel in a proceeding favors a right to appointed 
counsel.185 
 
 182. Numerous state and federal courts have relied on Gault to recognize a right to appointed 
counsel in civil proceedings. See, e.g., Sarzen v. Gaughan, 489 F.2d 1076, 1085 n.15 (1st Cir. 1973) 
(applying Gault to sexually dangerous civil commitment proceedings, and commenting, “Although 
the full panoply of criminal due process is not necessarily applicable to c. 123A proceedings . . . 
we follow the Supreme Court’s directive in In re Gault, . . . not to allow the ‘civil’ label to deflect 
us from the fundamental interest at stake.”); Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 395–96 (10th Cir. 
1968) (civil commitment proceedings); State v. Collman, 497 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Or. Ct. App. 1972) 
(same). 
 183. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 37 (1981) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting) (“[W]here the prescribed procedure involves informal decisionmaking without the 
trappings of an adversarial trial-type proceeding, counsel has not been a requisite 
of due process.”); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967) (“The requirement 
of counsel as an ingredient of fairness is a function of all of the other aspects of the hearing. Where 
the proceeding is noncriminal in nature, where the hearing is investigative and not adversarial and 
the government does not proceed through counsel, where the individual concerned is mature and 
educated, . . . and where the other aspects of the hearing taken as a whole are fair, due process does 
not require representation by counsel.”). 
 184. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 37. 
 185. See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 448–49 (2011) (explicitly noting that its holding 
rejecting a due process claim to appointed counsel in civil contempt cases does not apply to 
proceedings where the government is likely to have counsel); Wasson, 382 F.2d at 812 (“[W]here 
the hearing is investigative and not adversarial and the government does not proceed 
through counsel, where the individual concerned is mature and educated, . . . and where the other 
aspects of the hearing taken as a whole are fair, due process does not require representation 
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Indeed, removal proceedings are arguably more adversarial than 
juvenile delinquency proceedings.186 The most notable difference 
between juvenile court proceedings and removal proceedings is that 
one is brought for the benefit of the respondent (juvenile delinquency 
proceedings), and the other is not. This difference is most evident at 
disposition, after the charges are proven. In delinquency proceedings, 
the government must show that the juvenile is in need of supervision, 
treatment, or confinement, and the judge is to choose the least 
restrictive alternative consistent with the needs and best interest of the 
respondent and the need to protect the community.187 Similarly, the 
government in dependency proceedings, status offense proceedings, 
and judicial bypass hearings, acts with the child litigant’s best interests 
in mind.188 There is no comparable parens patriae or best interest 
superstructure to removal proceedings, and no obligation on the part 
of the judge to choose the least restrictive outcome or one that is in the 
best interest of the child respondent.189 To the contrary, once 
removability is shown, the respondent bears the burden in removal 
proceedings to show eligibility for relief and convince a judge to 
favorably exercise discretion in her favor.190 
Of course, adversariness is not a requirement for a right to 
appointed counsel. Judicial bypass proceedings, where most juveniles 
receive appointed counsel, do not involve accusations of wrongful 
 
by counsel.”); State ex rel. Cody v. Toner, 456 N.E.2d 813, 814 (Ohio 1983) (holding that denial 
of court-appointed counsel for an indigent paternity defendant who faces the state as an adversary 
violated due process). 
 186. In denying juvenile respondents a right to a jury trial in delinquency proceedings, the 
Supreme Court stated that it did not want to “remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary 
process.” McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). 
 187. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 352.2(2)(a) (McKinney 2012) (“[I]n determining an 
appropriate order [of disposition] . . . the court shall order the least restrictive available 
alternative . . . which is consistent with the needs and best interests of the respondent and the need 
for protection of the community.”); In re D.T., 818 N.E.2d 1214, 1230 (Ill. 2004) 
(“[I]n juvenile delinquency proceedings, the sentencing hearing is a best-interests hearing, albeit 
one in which the best interests of both the juvenile and the public are considered.”). 
 188. See, e.g., In re Interest of Karlie D., 811 N.W.2d 214, 224 (Neb. 2012) (“The foremost 
purpose and objective of the Nebraska Juvenile Code is to promote and protect the juvenile’s best 
interests, and the code must be construed to assure the rights of all juveniles to care and 
protection.”). 
 189. Cf. In re Dependency of S.K-P., 401 P.3d 442 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017) (denying a 
constitutional due process claim for appointed counsel in dependency proceedings because the child 
protective aim of dependency proceedings meant that the child’s relationship with the state in such 
proceedings was not adversarial), aff’d sub nom, In re Dependency of E.H., 427 P.3d 587 (Wash. 
2018). 
 190. 8 U.S.C. 1229(c)(4)(A) (2012). 
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conduct by the minor that will be proven by a trained prosecutor. 
Indeed, there is no party adverse to the minor in judicial bypass 
hearings. Nor may they result in court-ordered separation from family 
or any kind of detention or court-ordered supervision. Nevertheless, 
the vast majority of states that provide judicial bypass hearings 
mandate the appointment of counsel, and all make the appointment of 
a lawyer for the minor possible.191 
C.  Complex Governing Law 
“Courts have repeatedly recognized . . . that the immigration laws 
are ‘second only to the Internal Revenue Code in complexity.’”192 
According to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, “[a] lawyer is often 
the only person who [can] thread the [immigration-law] labyrinth.”193 
While complexity of the governing law has not been an articulated 
reason for providing child litigants a right to appointed counsel, the 
complexity of immigration law further underscores the need for 
appointed counsel for child respondents. 
That an immigration judge has a duty to explain procedures, 
develop the record, and identify possible relief does not diminish the 
need for appointed counsel for child litigants.194 These obligations are 
not insignificant, but they are not sufficient to ensure that the 
proceedings are fair for child litigants. Immigration judges cannot 
conduct independent fact investigation outside of hearings on the 
record, as a lawyer would do. Immigration judges cannot interview 
child respondents ex parte in an environment more conducive to 
disclosure of private facts than an open courtroom, as a child’s counsel 
would do.195 Simply put, whatever laudable efforts immigration 
judges may make in individual proceedings to develop the record and 
enable the respondent to understand the proceedings cannot make up 
for the incapacity of child litigants to assert their rights and present 
their cases. 
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On account of the law’s special concern for vulnerable minors 
and the broad consensus favoring appointed counsel for juvenile 
litigants, the absence of provisions for appointed counsel for juveniles 
in immigration removal proceedings is anomalous. Not only are they 
adversarial proceedings that involve complex statutory, constitutional, 
and procedural issues, they carry with them the potential for a 
consequence more severe than any civil proceeding in which juveniles 
already enjoy a right to appointed counsel. Given the potentially dire 
consequences of removal proceedings, no sound justification exists to 
exclude immigration removal proceedings from that consensus. 
CONCLUSION 
As Justice Felix Frankfurter put it long ago: “Children have a very 
special place in life which law should reflect. Legal theories and their 
phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning if 
uncritically transferred to determination of a State’s duty towards 
children.”196 Consistent with this approach, a substantial body of 
doctrine recognizes that minor litigants are entitled to counsel in civil 
proceedings when significant interests are at stake. Some of these 
proceedings involve allegations of wrongdoing, but not all of them do. 
Some of these proceedings can result in separation from family and 
deprivations of liberty, but not all of them do. Some of these 
proceedings are adversarial, with the government represented by 
trained prosecutors, but not all of them are. Indeed, some of the 
proceedings do not even involve an opposing party. What they all 
share are child litigants. And common sense and science tell us that 
children are simply unable to represent themselves in judicial 
proceedings. 
Immigration removal proceedings are adversarial, they are 
complex, they put the respondent’s liberty interest at stake, and they 
are presented by a trained prosecutor on behalf of the government. 
Consistent with decades of jurisprudence, a broad national consensus 
on the imperative of counsel for children, and the theory outlined here, 
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